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ABSTRACT: The nursing home industry receives three-
quarters of its income from government. The industry earns
high profits while providing poor patient care. Considerable
swindling of government funds occurs. One category is
nickel and diming, which consists of clipping every possible
dollar from government money as it passes through nursing
home accounts. Another method&mdash;large scale and often
within the law&mdash;involves the manipulation of ownership
and mortgages. There are several causes for the failure of
government to control nursing home swindles. While there
is no lack of regulations, the will to enforce them is lacking.
Industry lobbyists are especially influential at the state
level, where the Medicaid rate is set. The federal govern-
ment has failed to collect basic information about the
industry and denies the public ready access to the reports
on nursing home inspections. The industry’s immunity from
regulation, in large part, results from the lack of countervail-
ing pressure from the public.
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HE nursing home industry is
T highly profitable, having ex-
panded greatly in response to
government financing of health
care for the elderly and the indi-
gent. Yet, as has been widely
documented, most nursing homes
fail to provide a decent environ-
ment for their charges in spite of
government financing. The chronic
inability of government at all levels
to make increased spending on
nursing homes result in better pa-
tient care rather than in higher
profits for the industry constitutes a
dramatic case of the failure of gov-
ernment regulation.
INTRODUCTION
In the past-a past which seems
very distant now-families took
care of older people. They lived out
their last years in the homes of
their grown children. That, too, has
changed: older people now live
alone as long as they can. However,
for many, that time ends long be-
fore the end of their lives. Thus, for
those who are sick or who are alive
but cannot manage alone, the only
answer is the nursing home.
Usually, these people cannot pay
for the nursing homes they need,
because the old are generally poor,
as well as sick. People over sixty-
five have less income than younger
people; at the same time, they need
more health care. Health insurance
never covers long term nursing
home costs; moreover, for a variety
of reasons, the children of old
people frequently cannot pay these
bills either. This leaves only the
government.
Americans have turned over the
responsibility for older people-at
least for those who are sick and
poor-to the state. What happens
to old people is decided not by
families, but by bureaucracies. The
nursing home industry, although
privately owned, is a government
industry much like the Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation. By 1971 two-
thirds of the million people in
nursing homes were supported by
government, and more than three-
quarters of the $3.5 billion income
of nursing homes was public
money.
Public money began flooding the
health-care system, including nurs-
ing homes, after the 1965 adoption
of Medicare and Medicaid.
Medicare-title XVIII of the Social
Security Act-provided federal
financing for up to one hundred
days, following hospitalization, in a
nursing home. Medicaid-title
XIX-which is financed jointly by
the federal and respective state
governments, pays for an unlimited
nursing home stay.
These two acts set off a series of
profound changes in nursing
homes. In the years after Medicare
and Medicaid, health-care prices,
including those for nursing homes,
went up much faster than the gen-
eral price level. The mode of opera-
tion of the new health-care pro-
grams guaranteed excess profits but
no benefit to the patient-
especially in the case of the nurs-
ing home industry. Having taken
on the responsibility for sick and
poor older Americans, the gov-
ernment has nevertheless failed to
exercise the will to ensure the
proper carrying out of this respon-
sibility by the institutions to which
the old have been entrusted, al-
though there is theoretically an
elaborate regulation network to
cover both Medicaid and Medicare.
How MEDICAID WORKS
Medicaid-by far the biggest
source of money for nursing homes,
because it has no time limit-is
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regulated mainly by the states.
Each state, usually through its
health department, licenses and in-
spects nursing homes which accept
Medicaid patients. The state in-
spector decides whether the home
is meeting state and federal stan-
dards. Also, while Medicaid was
intended for the medically in-
digent-that is, those who cannot
afford the care they need-each
state decides who is eligible for
Medicaid. The income limit varies
from state to state and can be
somewhat higher than the income
limit for welfare. In this system the
local welfare caseworker plays an
essential part. The caseworker de-
cides whether an applicant is eligi-
ble for Medicaid and, if the appli-
cant has some resources-Social
Security, in most cases-how much
more Medicaid should pay the
nursing home for his care. Most
importantly, it is the caseworker
who usually chooses the nursing
home for the Medicaid patient.
Thus, the nursing home operator is
dependent on the inspector-who
could close his home for violations-
and on the caseworker-who can
either guarantee or close off his sup-
ply of patients. It is in these relation-
ships that the corruption and in-
difference of nursing home regu-
lators are most painfully evident.
The states also decide the rates
which nursing homes are to be paid
for Medicaid patients. Generally,
there are two ways of paying the
Medicaid bill: (1) flat rate, whereby
the nursing home directly receives
a set fee per patient per day and (2)
cost plus, whereby the nursing
home is reimbursed for its costs,
plus a &dquo;reasonable&dquo; profit. Wash-
ington’s role is mainly confined
to paying the federal share of
the cost, which ranges from 50 to
80 percent depending on the state.
Medicare, which pays for about 4
percent of the nursing home popu-
lation, operates entirely on federal
money and the cost-plus approach.
These, however, are not the only
ways in which federal money
reaches the nursing home. If a
patient gets Social Security, his
Medicaid bill is reduced by that
amount. The Veterans Administra-
tion (VA) also pays nursing homes
for the care of some patients com-
ing from VA hospitals.
The advent of Medicaid and
Medicare was a clear signal to
those seeking a fast way to make
money. Those businessmen and
hustlers already in the industry saw
the new money as a way to expand
their operations and their profits.
The industry expanded, and prices
went up. The patients suffered, not
so much because anyone set out to
make them suffer-although that
happens, too-but because lack of
effective controls resulted in lack of
incentives for improving patient
care. If anything, the operators of
nursing homes were motivated to
do exactly the opposite: much of
the increased profits could come
out of the hide of the patient.
Flat rate Medicaid money is the
most profitable to the operator and
the hardest on the patient. If the
government will pay, say, $14 a day
per patient, the way to make
money is obviously to cut daily
costs as far below $14 as one can.
Some costs, such as real estate taxes
and interest, cannot be cut. Thus,
costs which can be lowered are
those incurred by patient care, and
that is where the operators cut
comers.
First of all, one can buy cheap
food in the smallest possible
amounts. In the 1970s operators
were found who fed patients on
less than $1.00 a day; one, in
Chicago in 1970, managed to feed
his patients on $.78 a day. Not
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surprisingly, many nursing home
patients are emaciated.
One can also cut corners on staff:
hire a cheaper practical nurse
rather than a registered nurse. One
can pay the lowest rate for aides by
hiring people who cannot hold a
job anywhere else. The patients
will suffer-for example, incompe-
tent aides, who seem to be taking
out their own inadequacies on the
people in their charge, are respon-
sible for much of the brutality in
nursing homes-but the profits will
go up.
These variable costs are that part
of the nursing home operation
which is the most subject to gov-
ernmental regulation-at least on
paper. Thus, if the operator can cut
these costs, it is because the reg-
ulators let him get away with it.
From the point of view of the
operator, it is cheaper to buy off an
inspector or caseworker than to pay
the cost of decent patient care.
The game of profit is played
differently if the nursing home is
not paid a flat rate per patient per
day, but is reimbursed for its costs.
This is the method used by
Medicare and also by Medicaid in
some states. In this situation there
is no incentive to cut costs, since
the costs are passed on to the
government; the operator’s oppor-
tunity to increase profits lies in
padding his bills. This swindle is
made easy by the fact that the
government rarely conducts any ef-
fective audit of nursing home bills.
ANCILLARY FRAUD
The extra-or ancillary-ser-
vices which the government pur-
chases for nursing home patients
provide a rich field for exploita-
tion. Here, the opportunity for
profit lies in the operator’s rela-
tionship with people for whose
goods and services the government
pays. Although the operator does
not collect the money himself-it
is paid directly to the supplier-he
has the power to determine who
will collect, since he chooses the
suppliers and decides how much
they are to deliver. Thus, the
operator decides which pharmacist
will get the considerable drug bus-
iness his home provides. Since he
has no motive to demand a lower
price-the government is pay-
ing-it is common practice for
him to demand a kickback from the
pharmacist he chose. If the operator
is at all unscrupulous, he has other
opportunities to make extra money.
He can order expensive brand-
name drugs and let the pharmacist
fill the prescription with much
cheaper generic drugs which are
identical to the brand-name drugs;
the government pays the higher
price and the operator and pharma-
cist split the difference. Or, he can
order drugs in unnecessarily large
quantities. Or-most simply and
with the greatest profit-they can
bill the government for the drugs
which are never delivered at all.
The operator also chooses the
physicians who will be paid for
attending those patients who do not
have their own doctors. If both are
unscrupulous, the result is the gang
visit, as it is known in the trade
-that is, the physician whips
through the nursing home in a
couple of hours, glancing at only
the most urgent cases, and later
bills the government as if he had
given individual attention to each
patient. In its investigation of Ohio
nursing homes the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) found not a
few examples of such gang visits.
One doctor billed the government
for 487 visits within a sixteen-day
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period, including 90 on one day
and 86 on another. A podiatrist put
in for 750 visits, including 32 on
one Sunday. All these doctors were
also handling their usual load of
non-Medicaid patients. Physicians
and other health professionals can
also order, at government expense,
goods and services which the pa-
tients clearly do not need.
Such swindles may seem petty
when viewed individually. How-
ever, in sum, all those nickels and
dimes add up to many millions, if
not billions, of dollars a year. Nurs-
ing home operators and their col-
laborators can engage in these
deals safely, because there is little
risk of being caught and, even if
caught, virtually no risk of being
punished. Neither the GAO nor any
other investigating agency has
looked at more than a small fraction
of the records. Yet, if the pattern
found so far is typical of the
industry-and there is every
reason to believe it is-then there
are literally millions of frauds wait-
ing to be uncovered.
The nursing home operator and
his partners are not punished, ex-
cept in rare and extreme cases.
Typically, if a government auditor
catches the operator and, say, the
doctor cutting a little extra on the
side, all the auditor does is force
them to give back the money. The
case is not sent over to the district
attorney for criminal prosecution,
nor is any move made to revoke the
operator’s license. The operator’s
explanation-usually &dquo;clerical er-
ror&dquo;-is allowed to stand. This
happens even when the same
operators are caught time and time
again in the same types of fraud.
While the explanations begin to
wear thin, no attempt is made to
deter the operators from trying
again. There is, indeed, no reason
for them not to try again.
HIGH LEVEL SWINDLES
Beyond these types of swin-
dles-which are known to those
who follow the Medicaid scandals
-is a quite different kind of
fraud, cloaked in secrecy and
complexity, unknown to the public
and even to many nursing home
critics. Frauds at this level are the
most sophisticated method for
hustling the government for nurs-
ing home money. The opportunity,
once perceived, has drawn into the
nursing home field con men and
manipulators whose skills and imag-
ination put them in a class apart
from those operators whose stealing
is limited to kickbacks from phar-
macies and doctors. Few of these
newcomers have any experience in
nursing homes or in any other as-
pect of the health field. All they
know is how to make money, and
they sense that the nursing home is
a good place to use their talent.
The basic strategy of these
speculators is to manipulate the
ownership and mortgaging of those
nursing homes which receive
guaranteed government income in
order to extract the most revenue
and to pay back the least amount in
the form of income taxes. Among
the costs of operating a nursing
home are the costs of ownership
-that is, the amount paid out in
either rent or mortgage interest
payments-costs which are reim-
bursed by the govemment when it
pays for its Medicaid and Medicare
patients. The higher the cost of
ownership, the more the govern-
ment pays. Of course, the govern-
ment payment does not stay with
the operator; it goes on to the
owner-if the operator pays
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rent-or to the mortgage holder-
if the operator is also the owner.
Thus, higher ownership costs seem
to benefit someone other than the
operator.
The solution is to make the
owner appear to be someone other
than the operator, while in fact the
same people are collecting at both
ends. If, for example, a man owns a
nursing home, he may &dquo;sell&dquo; it to
someone who turns out to be a
friend or a relative, then &dquo;rent&dquo; it
back at a rental which requires the
government to increase its pay-
ments. He splits the profit between
himself as operator and himself, in
different guise, as owner. Or,
alternatively, he may build a nurs-
ing home and rent it, at a very high
figure, to a &dquo;nonprofit&dquo; corporation
he or his friends have created. The
government will pay more to that
corporation, because of the high
rental, than the amount-which
would have been based on the cost
of building the home-it would
have paid to him directly. The extra
payment, of course, comes back to
the owner in the form of the extra
high rent.. He may sell the home at
an inflated price to some associates,
who use the price as a basis for
getting higher payments from the
government. In each of these ma-
neuvers the amount being received
has been increased by increasing
the apparent cost of ownership.
The same principle can be applied
to other costs. One can drive up the
costs of supplies by paying more
than market price to suppliers, who
turn out to be either one’s as-
sociates or oneself under another
corporate name.
The method varies somewhat ac-
cording to the way the government
pays off. In a straight cost-
reimbursement situation-all Med-
icare patients and in some states
Medicaid patients, also-the payoff
is immediate, for the government
pays exactly the apparent cost, plus
a percentage of profit. If the cost is
raised, the payment goes up au-
tomatically. In - the case of homes
paid on flat rate system, the payoff is
not so quick. Here, the nursing
home industry must use the higher
costs of ownership as a basis for
lobbying the state for an increase in
the flat rate. In the almost annual
bouts of lobbying over the rates,
the nursing home representatives
use those costs as apparent hard
evidence that they need more
money. Unless the state looks be-
hind the figures, they will appear to
be convincing evidence; since, in
fact, the states usually take the
industry’s figures and simply shave
them a little, the contrived cost
increases eventually produce the
desired effect.
A universal reason for such com-
plex transactions is to hide the
incredibly high profits made by the
nursing home industry. For one
thing, too visible profits might un-
dercut the poormouthing which ac-
companies the industry’s pleas for
higher rates. In practice, these
profits do not seem to matter. For
example, in the late sixties nursing
homes were successfully lobbying
for higher rates at the same time
that stock speculators were pro-
nouncing the industry to be the
hottest thing on Wall Street.
In a broader sense, this industry
-as does any other-spends much
of its inventive skill in trying to
minimize the amount of income
tax it has to pay. When one makes
as much money as most nursing
homes do, that can be a prob-
lem. Shifts of ownership can help.
If, for example, one sells the
home at an inflated figure and then
rents it back, the profit can be taken
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as capital gains instead of regular
income, and the tax will be lower.
Shifting costs to the nursing
home is a way of shifting profits
out, into another corporation set up
for that purpose. Such an arrange-
ment may permit one to diffuse the
profits-perhaps by putting family
on the payroll-before Internal
Revenue can get at them. The nurs-
ing home chains, which have the
best accountants, have pioneered
this territory. One chain has at least
five subsidiaries from which it buys
goods and services.
It should be emphasized that
many of these tax-avoidance ploys
are legal. Legal or not, however,
the taxpayer bears the cost of the
nursing homes’ excessive profits.
Manipulating mortgages is
another aspect of profit making in
the nursing home industry. Despite
the many protestations to the con-
trary, there is no safer risk than the
nursing home. With guaranteed
government revenue, with a grow-
ing elderly population and with
high occupancy rate, there is, as
one Wall Street expert said, &dquo;no
way&dquo; not to make money in this
business. What could be a better
bet than to lend-or borrow-
money against guaranteed govern-
ment revenue? In this manner
many shoestring operators have
gotten their start. If they can scrape
together enough in loans-often
from the original owner-for the
down payment to buy a home, they
can get a first mortgage on the
home at the normal interest rate of
6 to 8 percent. That home can
subsequently be used as collateral
for second and third mortgages at
much higher rates of interest. Al-
though these interest payments can
then be used as the basis for higher
reimbursement, there is, in fact, no
requirement that the money from
such second and third mortgages be
used for the nursing home itself.
Government revenue, in effect,
endorses pyramiding and other
dubious business practices. The
sure supply of government-
supported patients allows nursing
home owners to take risks which
other kinds of businesses cannot
afford. Not only that: by underwrit-
ing manipulations that artificially
increase nursing home costs, the
government also guarantees un-
necessary increases in the rates it
pays for patient care. That, too, has
a double effect, for each increase in
rates drives onto Medicaid people
who were able to pay their own
way when the rates were lower.
Higher rates thus increase the
number of patients supported by
government, as well as the rate
paid for each patient. In these
many ways government policy-or
lack of policy-has served to en-
rich nursing home owners at the
expense of both taxpayers and pa-
tients.
TOLERANT REGULATORS
This situation-in which ever
larger amounts of government
money disappear, ever higher
profits are made and patient care is
not at all improved-is tolerated by
governmental regulators at all
levels. The problem is not a lack of
regulations; the industry is fes-
tooned with rules which theoreti-
cally determine its conduct. How-
ever, the regulations are not en-
forced.
Year after year the rules laid
down by government are dis-
obeyed. Thus, reformers who de-
mand better regulations miss the
point, and in a way that is danger-
ously deceptive. It is relatively
easy for reformers to achieve a
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change in the regulations and then
to go home believing that they have
made a lasting change in the way
the nursing home industry actually
operates.
The nursing home industry has
won for itself a large degree of
immunity from accountability to
those who finance it. How this has
been done is not entirely clear, for
there is no comprehensive informa-
tion on nursing home lobbying-
-or, for that matter, on its profits
or on its ownership. Enough is
known, however, to suggest why
the industry finds government such
an easy target.
The state is the crucial level of
government. The Medicaid reim-
bursement rate, by far the most
important source of revenue in the
industry, is set by the state legisla-
tures. Moreover, nursing home in-
spection is generally a state func-
tion.
The industry seems to be influen-
tial in the state legislatures. Since
nursing homes are widely dis-
persed, most legislators have at
least one in their district. Owners
and operators show up regularly as
campaign contributors. Although
the amounts one hears about-
-$500 or $1,000-are paltry when
compared to the amounts which
change hands in presidential elec-
tions, that kind of money can buy
considerable influence in a state
legislature, especially in the ab-
sence of countervailing pressure.
The absence of such pressures
largely results from the way
Medicaid is financed. Although the
state legislature sets the Medicaid
rate, the federal government pays
from 50 to 80 percent of the bill. So, a
state legislator considering compet-
ing demands for money knows that
half, or more than half, of what he
votes for nursing homes will not
have to be paid by state taxes: a
dollar for the nursing homes only
costs the state from 20 to 50 cents.
Thus, nursing home lobbying can
pay high returns.
In a recent speech John Timothy
McCormack, an Ohio state rep-
resentative from Cleveland, set
forth his view of the relative pres-
sures on state legislators:
The nursing home industry is very well
organized, is well represented in terms
of lobbyists in the Legislature ...
There is not a high degree of inter-
est relative to nursing homes in the
Legislature. There is not a high degree
of knowledge and there is very little
public attention focussed on the prob-
lem.... The only voice that has
come through clearly is that of the
nursing home industry.... The in-
dustry, in fact, plays the dominant role
in the establishment of rates that are set
by the Legislature. Now that undoubt-
edly means that the best way to deter-
mine what the rates will be for the
nursing homes [is] to look at the most
recent edition of the nursing home
industry magazine, [see] which Senator
is featured on the cover with his bio-
graphical statement and given credit for
saving the industry. Determine how
much power that Senator has and you
can probably determine just how those
rates might be established in the Legis-
lature.
In Washington the federal agency
most concerned with nursing
homes is the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW). It
has shown little effective interest in
the industry, and its consistent pol-
icy of secrecy has kept the public
and Congress in the dark about
nursing home realities. It is mainly
because of HEW that the basic facts
about nursing home ownership and
profits remain unknown. When
Congress mandated HEW to find
out who owns nursing homes, the
agency evaded the legislative in-
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tent by permitting empty replies,
such as the statement that a given
nursing home’s owner was a corpo-
ration. As for profits, HEW has
simply never tried to find out, al-
though it would seem impossible to
evaluate nursing home reimburse-
ment rates without knowing what
profits the industry is making.
The most blatant form of secrecy
practiced by HEW involves the
reports of nursing home inspec-
tions. If there is any single piece of
information to which the public
should be entitled, it is the inspec-
tor’s current report on a nursing
home. Any member of the
public-not to mention the tax-
payers, who may be interested in
what the home is doing with their
money-should have the right to
see the reports before choosing a
nursing home. The only effect of
hiding that information is to protect
both the operator who runs a bad
home and the inspector who lets
him get away with it.
That fig leaf was at last
ripped-or so it seemed-from the
industry in 1972 by the courts: a
successful suit by a newsman, Mal
Schechter, of the magazine Hospi-
tal Practice, forced HEW to grant
access to Medicare inspection re-
ports. The bureaucracy resisted
stubbornly. HEW interpreted its
defeat in the courts to mean only
that Schechter himself could have
access to the eight reports on which
he had brought his suit, not that the
public at large had any right to see
Medicare inspection reports.
In 1972 the Congress adopted
legislation requiring HEW to make
public both Medicare and Med-
icaid reports. This law did not,
however, settle the issue because,
as always, the agency-not
Congress-is to implement the
law. HEW was far from giving up
the struggle to keep the public in
the dark. As of this writing, the
regulations proposed by HEW
would only make public an extract
from the inspector’s report, not the
full report. Furthermore, that ex-
tract in the case of Medicare could
only be seen-not ordered by mail
or phone-at a Social Security
office. In the case of Medicaid one
can inspect the extract at the local
welfare office. Thus, a member of
the public can see those extracts, if
he is willing to find his way to the
proper office, no matter how far,
and if-the biggest if of all-he
happens to find out that he is
entitled to the information. No one
is broadcasting the news.
The distance between HEW’s
policy of secrecy and a policy of
protecting the public interest can
be most clearly measured by con-
trasting what the agency did with
what it has not done. At no time did
HEW take the simple, effective
step of ordering operators of all
nursing homes receiving federal
money to post the latest inspection
report prominently in the home,
with copies available to potential
applicants. Such a procedure would
make available to those most con-
cerned the inspector’s judgment on
the home and would also enable
someone reading the posted report
to contrast it with the reality around
him.
Much of government’s role in
overseeing the spending of its
money has been, in effect, abdi-
cated to the health industry. This
has happened in the choice of what
are called fiscal intermediaries.
When Medicaid and Medicare
were. created, it was obvious that
they would cause a flood of paper
work in the form of millions of
individual bills being presented to
government for payment. Medicare
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and, in some states, Medicaid re-
tained existing organizations to
process the papers-that is, to
audit and to pay the individual bills
for the government. This lightened
the government work load, but it
also removed from government
much of the responsibility of the
newly created programs.
The organizations selected as
fiscal intermediaries in most parts
of the country are Blue Cross and
its sister organization, Blue Shield.
Blue Cross is itself part of the
health industry. Controlled by hos-
pitals and doctors, it was founded
to help hospitals collect their bills.
It has always defended the in-
terests of the health industry in
conflicts with those-whether con-
sumers or government-who pay
the bills. Nursing homes are first
cousins to hospitals; their financial
practices are similar, and so are the
ways in which their costs are un-
necessarily inflated and passed on
to government. Therefore, when
government chose Blue Cross as a
fiscal intermediary, to a large extent
it was allowing the health industry
to regulate itself.
Some of those who made nursing
home policy for HEW have had
direct ties to the industry. For some
years the chairman of HEW’s Na-
tional Advisory Council on Nursing
Home Administration was Harold
Baumgarten. Baumgarten was pres-
ident of one corporation operating a
nursing home and director of
another-facts never mentioned in
the extensive biographical material
about him which HEW published.
The HEW staff man for that Coun-
cil was Charles A. Cubbler; he was
a director of the nursing home
corporation of which Baumgarten
was president. When HEW was
instructed by Congress to draft
standards nursing homes would
have to meet to qualify for
Medicaid-a question of crucial
importance to the industry-the
agency hired Harold Smith as a
consultant to write the standards.
Smith was not only a former official
of the Louisiana Nursing Home
Association, but was also serving as
chairman of the Legislative Com-
mittee of the American Nursing
Home Association at the time he
was hired by HEW.
WHY REGULATION FAILS
Such examples should not be
read to mean that personal connec-
tions between the industry and its
regulators, nor the occasional in-
stances of outright corruption, are
the only explanation for the failure
of government regulators. There
are other, less dramatic, factors in-
volved. One is the familiar
phenomenon of bureaucratic las-
situde. If the typical nursing home
regulator is to do his job well, he
must work hard and suffer recur-
ring conflicts with those whom he
regulates. He must do so,
moreover, with little support; in
fact, he is under constant pressure
to go easy on the nursing homes
and under little or no pressure to
do the opposite. Being human, in-
spectors usually succumb to the
strongest pressures.
The difficult, small-scale nature
of nursing home regulation is
another important factor. In the
regulation of this industry there are
no great decisive moments on
which public attention can focus,
no equivalents of the congressional
votes on the ABM or the Lockheed
loan. Instead, the action takes place
in 23,000 nursing homes across the
country, and the failure of the reg-
ulators is not found in dramatic
actions, but in numberless small
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duties left undone. Those lobbying
for nursing home reform cannot
mobilize themselves for a single
pitched battle; they must be pre-
pared to exert continuing pressure
over many years and in many
places.
The Nixon administration’s nurs-
ing home reform program provides
an illustration. In August, 1971, the
president announced an eight-point
program to deal with the problems
of nursing homes. Of the eight
points, the most important was the
promise to cut off Medicare and
Medicaid funds to nursing homes
which did not meet &dquo;reasonable
standards.&dquo; By mid-1973 it became
obvious that little had improved, in
spite of the president’s announced
intent: only one of every two
hundred patients in a Medicaid-
eligible home was actually moved
to another-presumably better-
home. Furthermore, for two years
demands for reform could be warded
off with a reference to the de-
cisive actions which were in the
making.
Lack of effective public pressure
is, of course, the most basic reason
for the failure of nursing home
regulation. The primary victims-
the patients-are unable to make
effective protest against their lot.
Most patients do not have con-
cerned relatives; relatives who are
concerned have not constituted an
effective lobby. The financial vic-
tims of the nursing homes-the
taxpayers-are no more effectively
organized to combat this form of
waste than they are any other.
Older people-strong lobbyists on
some issues-have not had much
impact on nursing home policy.
One possible reason is that older
people have more reason than most
to fear an institution in which they
may soon find themselves. Most of
all, the lack of public pressure for
nursing home reform may simply
be another expression of our turn-
ing away from the realities of old
age.
